ABSTRACT This paper considers modal split in daily travel when there is a railroad parallel to a bottleneckconstrained road between home and a workplace. We examine the optimality and efficiency of different railroad fare and road toll (RFRT) schemes with the boundedly rational mode choice behavior of travelers. Under such behavior, commuters do not necessarily choose the mode of which the travel cost is absolutely lower than the mode of the other. A general definition of boundedly rational bi-modal equilibrium (BRBE) is presented. As the BRBE solution is not unique, the best-, worst-and average-case total travel costs under BRBE for a given RFRT scheme are proposed. The performance of each RFRT policy under different traveler levels of BR in mode choice behavior is also examined. The numerical results illustrate that system travel costs may be uncertain within the BRBE set, and the proposed RFRT schemes are able to address uncertainty due to the non-unique BRBE solution.
I. INTRODUCTION
Vickrey [1] first developed an endogenous departure time choice model and presented the original bottleneck model, which studies traffic congestion on a bottleneck-constrained highway between home and a workplace. Each traveler faces a trade-off between the waiting time cost attributed to queue length before the bottleneck and the schedule delay cost of arriving early or late.
Subsequently, the bottleneck model has been extended by many scholars [2] - [5] . Laih [6] , [7] and Lindsey et al. [8] investigated the effects of alternative step tolls on alleviating the queue before the bottleneck. Yao et al. [9] , [10] proposed a stochastic bottleneck model with heterogeneous commuters and introduced congestion derivatives to reduce the total social cost. Xiao et al. [11] studied the effect of flat toll on the morning commuters' departure time choices. However, there usually exists a road network rather than a single route. Arnott et al. [12] and Liu and Nie [13] considered two roads with a bottleneck and examined route choice and departure time decisions. Nevertheless, these studies only considered one travel mode (auto mode) for commuters.
Tabuchi [14] first developed a bi-modal (highway/transit) transportation system in which the transit line and highway are physically separated. Huang [15] extended this work by allowing for body congestion in carriages and heterogeneous travelers. Different from Tabuchi [14] and Huang [15] , Huang [16] employed a logit-based modal split model to examine the road pricing problem in a two-mode network with elastic demand. Danielis and Marcucci [17] also extended work by Tabuchi by exploring the efficiency of several road pricing schemes. Mirabel and Reymond [18] proposed the redistribution of revenues from road usage that charged public users in a simple bi-modal transportation system. Recently, Nie and Yin [19] and Tian et al. [20] introduced the tradable credit scheme in the two-mode problem to manage traffic congestion.
All of the abovementioned literature assumes that travelers are perfectly rational; i.e., they always choose the mode (or route) of which the travel cost is the lowest. However, the perfect rationality (PR) assumption is very restrictive in reality and the traditional network equilibrium assignment model could not make accurate prediction of traffic flow.
In other words, travelers may not always choose a mode (or route) with the minimum travel cost, as may result from imperfect travel information and certain inertia in decision making. For instance, when switching to another mode (or route) only results in a small or negligible decrease in individual travel cost, there is no motivation for some users to change the current mode (or route) in practice. Such users are said to be ''boundedly rational'' in mode (or route) choice. Thus, many scholars aimed to relax the PR assumption in their study on travel choice behavior.
Mahmassani and Chang [21] first studied the existence and uniqueness properties of boundedly rational user equilibrium (BRUE). Similar to Conlisk [22] , Nakayama et al. [23] indicated that the PR assumption should be relaxed in traffic equilibrium analyses by experimental studies. Szeto and Lo [24] incorporated BR in the dynamic user equilibrium problem. Lou et al. [25] systematically examined the mathematical properties of the BRUE solution, e.g., the non-uniqueness and non-convexity of the BRUE solution set. Guo and Liu [26] developed a BRUE-based day-to-day dynamic model to describe the irreversible network change. Di et al. [27] proposed transportation network design methodologies within the framework of BRUE. Wang et al. [28] studied the optimal transit fare policy in a bi-modal transportation system comprising mass transit and private cars under BR assumptions. Di et al. [29] formulated the BRUE flow pattern as a nonlinear complementarity problem and explored the mathematical properties of BRUE solution set. The above studies implied that the BR framework plays an important role in route/modal choice modeling.
In this paper, we try to address the boundedly rational mode choice behaviors of travelers in a competitive highway/transit network. Under boundedly rational bi-modal equilibrium (BRBE), no commuter has an incentive to change his or her mode if the travel cost savings offered by changing to the other mode is not large enough. It is noted that the bi-modal equilibrium is a limiting case of the general multimodal equilibrium.
Significantly, BRBE flow distributions in a bi-modal network are generally not unique [21] , [25] , [29] . However, all BRBE flow patterns can be obtained from the BRBE solution set, which offers traffic managers convenient knowledge of the variability of traffic flows in the bi-modal network. Unfortunately, such a variability incurred by the BRBE may reduce the efficiency of traditional railroad fare and road toll (RFRT) schemes. For example, the RFRT scheme commonly executed in the bi-modal literature [14] - [17] may not eliminate traffic congestion effectively because the BRBE flow distribution is uncertain.
The main purpose of this study is to examine the optimality and efficiency of several RFRT regimes under BRBE. We take into account two types of road toll schemes as follows: a fine toll and a uniform toll. Meanwhile, we focus on three kinds of railroad fares including when fares are charged equal to the marginal cost of the transit authority, when fares are charged equal to average cost of the transit authority and when fares are charged to minimize the total travel cost (TTC). In case the BRBE has multiple solutions for a given RFRT scheme, uncertain solutions may lead to uncertain objective values (i.e., TTC). To address this issue, the best-case (BC), worst-case (WC), and average-case (AC) scenarios are proposed, demonstrating the minimum, maximum and average TTC, respectively, since the BRBE solution varies. Thus, it can provide a better understanding for urban planners on how to design effective RFRT regimes when the modal equilibrium pattern is non-unique.
The contributions of this paper are two-fold. On the one hand, we introduce the BR assumption in modeling travelers' mode choice behavior in a simple two-mode network. Travelers are assumed to follow the BR behavioral rule in decision-making processes of mode choice, i.e., they would only switch the other mode when the improved travel cost exceeds some indifference bands. Then, traffic flow patterns stabilize to the specific equilibrium, called BRBE. On the other hand, due to non-uniqueness of BRBE set, three attitudes, risk-averse, risk-neutral and risk-prone towards designing RFRT schemes are discussed, which are based on the best, the worst and the distribution of the TTC of a simple bi-modal transportation system respectively. The comparison of our contributions to those in the literature can be shown in Table 1 . This article is organized as follows. In Section 2, the basic model is proposed. Section 3 gives the optimal railroad fare scheme. Section 4 presents marginal cost-based railroad fare and various road toll regimes. In Section 5, we consider average cost-based railroad fare and different road toll policies. We make some numerical simulations in Section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper.
II. THE BASIC MODEL
In a typical day, there are N identical commuters who drive on a bottleneck-constrained highway from a residential area VOLUME 6, 2018 to a workplace. Drivers would experience a generalized travel cost including two components, the travel time cost and the schedule delay cost. The travel cost per auto user who departs from home at time (t) is derived as:
where α is the unit cost of travel time, β is the schedule penalty for a unit time of early arrival and γ is schedule penalty for a unit time of late arrival, t 0 is the time at which the queue on the highway begins, t 1 is the time at which the queue on the highway ends,t is the departure time at which an auto user arrives punctually, and t * is the work starting time. T (t) is the commuting time for an auto user who departure for home at time t. At equilibrium, the commuter experiences the same travel cost no matter what time he or she departures from home. It is easy to derive the important time at equilibrium:
where δ = βγ β+γ . and the equilibrium travel cost of an auto:
where s is the bottleneck capacity. Tabuchi [14] developed a two-mode model in which there are a bottleneck-constrained highway and a railroad between home and the workplace. In the model, N commuters split into N a and N b (road commuters and railroad commuters, respectively), and N a + N b = N holds. The perfectly rational bi-modal equilibrium (PRBE) can thus be defined as follows:
where C a is the average travel cost of a motorist and C b is the travel cost of public transport, which will be explained thereinafter.
The above model assumes that users are perfect, which makes the equilibrium unboundedly rational. In this study, we introduce BR into the mode choice behavior of users and develop a BRBE model. We define boundedly rational travelers as those who would switch to a new travel mode only if its utility is larger than the utility of the current mode plus a threshold value. That is, a mode is still ''acceptable'' if the distinction between its travel utility, and the largest-utility is no larger than a pre-determined threshold value.
To mathematically define BRBE and facilitate discussion later, further assumptions are listed below:
Assumption 1: Commuters in the bi-modal network own the same indifference threshold value, denoted as λ (λ ≥ 0).
Assumption 2: The number of commuters N is large enough that all commuters would simultaneously use both modes (private car and public transport), which are very reasonable in reality.
Assumption 3: The mass transit can make commuters arrive at work on time, and there is no body congestion at railway stations and in carriages.
The λ− BRBE can thus be characterized as follows:
The parameter λ stands for the extent of bounded rationality in the mode choice decision progress of commuters; this progress can be specified by an urban traffic survey. Apparently, the smaller the value of λ is, the more rational the mode choices of travelers are. Note that when λ = 0, the λ−BRBE condition reduces to the traditional PRBE condition.
Attention is limited here to the situation in which both private car (mode a) and public transport (mode b) are used (see Assumption 2) . Therefore, the λ−BRBE condition can be expressed as follows:
In other words, we only study the case in which both modes are simultaneously used.
III. RAILROAD FARE AND ROAD TOLL A. OPTIMAL UNIFORM RAILROAD FARE OR ROAD TOLL
Let us first investigate the case in which the railroad fare is set by the public authority to minimize the TTC. In theory, this is clearly equivalent to the uniform road toll that minimizes the total travel cost. From a technological point of view, however, the fare regime would be more practical than the toll regime [14] . Let p o denote the system optimum-based fare (SOF); the travel cost per auto and train commuter can be rewritten as (superscript o represents the ''optimal railroad fare'' scheme):
Using Eqs. (3) and (4), we can obtain the following modal split at BRBE under the optimal uniform railroad fare system:
Here, we assume that p o > λ. If p o ≤ λ, the same conclusion is available.
Thus, TTC is given by:
where c and F are marginal cost and fixed cost of railroad authority, respectively. The first term in Eq. (6) is the total time cost of auto commuters, while the second and third terms are the total cost of the railroad operator. From Eq. (5), we get that BRBE has multiple solutions. Then, it will be unknown which modal split pattern will be realized once a railroad fare is charged. The BRBE solution set therefore represents uncertainty and difficulty in the railroad fare design. To address this issue, one can employ robust optimization technique. Similar methods have also been applied in Lou et al. [25] , Ban et al. [30] , [31] , and Wang et al. [32] .
According to the robust optimization perspective, the executed fare should be optimal for the ''worst case'' situation, which refers to the largest objective value (i.e., TTC) as the BRBE solution varies. This can be called the ''risk averse'' design approach for railroad fares, which can be derived by the following min-max formulation:
Clearly, for the ''risk prone'' railroad fare, the objective is to optimize the fare for the ''best case'' situation. In this paper, the ''best case'' for a given fare refers to the lowest objective value (i.e., TTC) as BRBE solution varies. Then, the riskprone design approach for railroad fare could be determined as a following min-min problem:
As the risk-averse/risk-prone approach tries to optimize for the ''worst/best case'' objective value, the optimization results will always be better/worse off as the BRBE solution varies. It is well known that the risk-averse railroad fare is generally too pessimistic, while the risk-prone railroad fare is generally too optimistic. The reason is that both fares focus on the extreme case, i.e., a single point in the BRBE solution set. To overcome the problem, we introduce a ''risk neutral'' railroad fare regime that explicitly takes into account the entire BRBE solution set. Thus, the risk-neutral fare tries to optimize for the mean of objective value (i.e., the expected TTC) as the BRBE solution changes. Based on this setting, assuming that N o a follows uniform distribution in the range
δ , the risk-neutral fare can be expressed as the following optimal problem:
where E (·) is the expectation operator.
B. MARGINAL COST-BASED RAILROAD FARE AND ROAD TOLL
Denote c as the marginal cost of a railroad operator, which is independent of the number of passengers. In this section, it is assumed that the railroad authority charges the railroad fare equal to marginal cost. In particular, we investigate three RFRT schemes, namely, the marginal cost-based fare (MCF) on a railroad with no toll (NT) on the road, the MCF on a railroad with a fine toll (FT) on the road, and the MCF on a railroad with uniform toll (UT) on the road.
1) MARGINAL COST-BASED FARE ON A RAILROAD WITH NO-TOLL ON A ROAD
If the public authority sets a railroad fare at marginal cost (p m,n = c) and road tolls cannot be levied due to certain technical or political reasons, the public authority would utilize a railroad fare as a transport policy tool. Here, the superscript m, n represents the ''marginal cost-based railroad fare and no toll'' scheme. The travel cost per auto and train commuter can be derived as: 
Using Eqs. (3) and (10), we obtain the following modal split at BRBE:
Here, we assume that c > λ. If c ≤ λ, the same conclusion is available.
The TTC is then given by:
From Eq. (11), we know that BRBE has multiple solutions, which therefore leads to uncertainty in the TTC at equilibrium. Clearly, we can find the best-case (BC) or worst-case (WC) BRBE flow distributions with the minimum or maximum TTC from the optimization problems below. 
According to Eqs. (11)-(13), it is easy to obtain the bestcase TTC TC m,n BC and the worst-case TTC TC m,n WC (here, the subscript BC represents the ''best-case'', the subscript WC represents the ''worst-case''). From Eq. (11), it is assumed that N m,n a follows uniform distribution in the range (c − λ) s δ , (c + λ) s δ . Subsequently, the expected value of the TTC, that is, the average-case TTC will be (here the subscript AC represents the ''average-case''):
2
) MARGINAL COST-BASED FARE ON A RAILROAD WITH A FINE TOLL ON A ROAD
It is supposed that a time-dependent fine toll (τ m,f ) can be exercised by an electronic device; then any queue can be eliminated, and the TTC can be much reduced (here the superscript m, f denotes the ''marginal cost-based railroad fare and fine toll'' scheme). However, the execution of the fine toll does not change the modal split pattern, that is,
= N m,n a . We can easily deduce the following BRBE solution set:
According to the calculations of Mirabel and Reymond [18] , the fine toll (time-varying toll) is specified by the transit fare minus the schedule delay cost:
Since the queue before the bottleneck can be eliminated by the application of the fine toll, the total travel time cost is zero while the total schedule delay cost is δN m,f a 2s. Therefore, the TTC is:
Consequently, we can find the BC-or WC-BRBE flow distribution with the best or worst travel delay from the optimization problems below. 
Using Eqs. (15) (17) and (18), it is easy to obtain the bestcase TTC TC (15) and (17), the average-case total travel cost can be derived:
3) MARGINAL COST-BASED FARE ON A RAILROAD WITH A UNIFORM TOLL ON A ROAD
The uniform road toll on a road would add constant costs to drivers and alter their mode choices. Let τ m,u denote the uniform road toll; the travel cost per auto and train commuter can be rewritten as (here the superscript m, u denotes the ''marginal cost-based railroad fare and uniform toll'' scheme): 
From Eqs. (3) and (20), we obtain the following modal split at BRBE with the implementation of the uniform toll:
Here, we assume that τ m,u < c − λ. If τ m,u ≥ c − λ, the same conclusion is available. 
C. AVERAGE COST-BASED RAILROAD FARE AND ROAD TOLL
In this section, it is assumed that the railroad authority sets the railroad fare equal to average cost. In particular, we investigate three RFRT policies, namely, the average costbased fare (ACF) on a railroad with NT on the road, the ACF on a railroad with FT on the road, and the ACF on a railroad with UT on the road.
1) AVERAGE COST-BASED FARE ON A RAILROAD WITH NO TOLL ON A ROAD
If the railroad company sets a fare p a,n equal to its average cost, the travel cost per auto and train commuter can be rewritten as (here the superscript a, n denotes the ''average cost-based railroad fare and no toll'' scheme): 
From Eqs. (3) and (26), it is straightforward to obtain the following modal split at BRBE:
The TTC is then expressed by:
Similarly, we can find the best-case or worst-case BRBE flow distributions from the optimization problems below. 
2) AVERAGE COST-BASED FARE ON A RAILROAD WITH A FINE TOLL ON A ROAD
Taking advantage of the theoretical framework developed by Tabuchi [14] , the fine toll (τ a,f (t)) is derived by the transit fare minus the schedule delay cost (here the superscript a, f denotes the ''average cost-based railroad fare and fine toll'' scheme):
However, the fine toll proposed above makes no sense in theory. As mentioned, BRBE has multiple solutions. The number of auto commuters N a,f a in Eq. (31) is not unique, which makes the toll scheme uncertain and meaningless.
3) AVERAGE COST-BASED FARE ON A RAILROAD WITH A UNIFORM TOLL ON A ROAD
Let τ a,u denote the uniform road toll, the travel cost per auto and train commuter can be rewritten as (here the superscript a, u denotes the ''marginal cost-based railroad fare and uniform toll'' scheme): 
From Eqs. (3) and (32), we obtain the following modal split at BRBE with the implementation of the uniform toll:
Thus, the risk-averse uniform road toll can be determined by the following min-max problem:
The risk-prone uniform road toll could be formulated as the following min-min problem: Up to now, we investigate a fine toll and uniform toll on a road, which may belong to the ''second-best congestion pricing''. As noted by Danielis and Marcucci [17] : ''If the railway fare is charged to the average cost, the road regulator should be set road tolls at their optimal second-best level''. Not only so, they also declared that: ''If the railroad fare is charged equal to its average cost and the road authority does not adjust road tolls, we have a third-best situation''. However, the third-best situation would not emerge under the BR assumption. A possible explanation is that the optimal uniform road toll is not well-determined when the railroad fare is charged equal to its marginal cost. This notion is different from the result under the PR assumption.
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
Now, we adopt some numerical examples to support our analyses in the above sections and examine the characteristics of several RFRT schemes. The value of the basic parameters are: (γ , α, β) = (3.0, 1.2, 0.6) $ min , s = 3 veh min , c = 20 $ commuter , F = 300 ($), and N = 300 (commuter). The above models can be easily solved by Lingo 12.
A. EXAMPLE 1: RAILROAD FARE POLICIES Fig. 1(a) presents the best-, worst-, and average-case system performances that the system optimum-based fare scheme may achieve while the BR threshold parameter λ varies from 0 to 5. In Lou et al. [25] , the value of the threshold parameter is assumed to be a percentage of the equilibrium cost. Guo and Liu [26] and Di et al. [29] , the threshold value is given as a constant value in the small network. For simplicity, in this study, we also assume that the value of λ is constant. When λ = 0, the BRBE reduces to the PRME and there is no distinction between the best-, worst-and average-case TTC values. From Fig. 1(a) , we can see that the performances difference becomes more substantial as the value of λ increases. The best-case BRBE flow distribution does not vary with the threshold value. In fact, it is equivalent to the system optimum flow distribution under the PR assumption. However, the worst-and average-case total travel costs are monotonically increasing with the threshold value. Fig. 1(a) confirms that the average-case objective value is between the best-and worst-case ones. This outcome means that the risk-neutral RFRT scheme is less optimistic than the risk-prone scheme but less conservative than the risk-averse scheme. Due to consideration of the entire BRBE solution set, the averagecase BRBE flow distribution may be closer to real fact. Fig. 1(b) compares the total travel cost of the best-case BRBE flow distribution under MCF, ACF, and SOF. Interestingly, the best-case system travel costs under MCF and ACF all decrease with the threshold value. Fig. 1(c) shows the worst-case total travel cost with three types of railroad fare regime. It can be found that the system performance under MCF and ACF all become worse as the threshold value increases. The same result can be obtained from Fig. 1(d) , which depicts the average-case system travel cost under different railroad fare policies. These results are mainly due to the non-uniqueness of the BRBE solution. From Eqs. (11) and (27) , the lower bound for the number of auto commuters decreases while the upper bound increases as the value of λ increases. Therefore, the best-case total travel cost may become lower while the worst-and average-case costs may become larger.
From Figs. 1(b), 1(c) and 1(d), we can also see that the SOF is the best policy, MCF is better, and ACF is the worst policy in all three cases. This outcome can be easily explained. The cheaper transit fare attracts more transit users and generates lower system travel cost. However, the public transport company may suffer a heavy loss and need to be subsidized by government. Fig. 2(a) shows the best-, worst-and average-case TTC under the implementation of MCF on a railroad and NT on a road. Clearly, as the value of λ increases, the worst-and average-case system travel costs increase, but the best-case costs decrease. Fig. 2(b) gives the best-, worst-and averagecase TTC with the application of MCF and FT. Interestingly, the best-case system travel cost does not vary with the threshold value. However, the worst-and average-case total travel costs are monotonically increasing with the threshold value. The same results can also be seen from Fig. 2(c) , which depicts the best-case, worst-and average-case total travel cost VOLUME 6, 2018 with the adoption of MCF and UT. As previously mentioned, the optimal railroad fare is equivalent to the uniform road toll that minimizes the total travel cost (see Figs. 1a and 2c) . Fig. 3(a) compares the best-case TTC with NT, TF and UT on a road while the MCF is set on a railroad. We can see that the best-case system travel cost with NT on a road falls along with the threshold value. Interestingly, the best-case TTC with UT increases, but the case with FT does not change with an increasing threshold value. Fig. 3(b) shows the change in worst-case TTC with the threshold value under NT, FT, and UT on a road. It can be seen that TTC will all increase as the threshold value increases. The same results can be obtained from Fig. 3(c) which depicts how the average-case system travel cost change with the threshold value under NT, FT, and UT on a road. The reasons for these have been explained in the subsection above. From Fig. 3 , we can also conclude that FT and UT decrease TTC significantly compared to the situation with NT.
B. EXAMPLE 2: MARGINAL COST-BASED FARE WITH ROAD TOLL
C. EXAMPLE 3: AVERAGE COST-BASED FARE WITH A ROAD TOLL Fig. 4(a) plots the changes in the best-, worst-and averagecase total travel cost with the threshold value λ under the implementation of ACF on a railroad and NT on a road. As the value of λ increases, the worst-and average-case system travel costs increase, but the best-case costs decrease. Fig. 4(b) gives how the best-, worst-and average-case total travel cost change with the threshold value under the application of ACF and UT. It can be seen that the best-case system travel cost is the least and does not vary with the threshold value. However, the worst-and average-case total travel costs increase with the threshold value. show the worst-and average-case TTC when the threshold value changes from 0 to 5 under two types of road tolls. Clearly, there is less variability in the TTC under UT on a road in any case. This outcome suggests that compared to the NT case, the UT is more effective and reliable at inducing commuters to use the two modes more efficiently.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have discussed the boundedly rational mode choice behavior of commuters in a bi-modal transportation system and presented a general definition of BRBE. The BRBE model has multiple solutions for a given RFRT regime. Under the best-, worst-, and average-case BRBE, we investigated seven RFRT schemes, namely, the SOF, the MCF with NT, FT, and UT, and the ACF with NT, FT, and UT. Through this study, we understand how the boundedly rational mode choice behavior of commuters affects the system travel cost and the effectiveness of RFRT policies. We have gained some interesting findings from the sensitivity analyses on the level of BR with the aid of numerical examples.
For future research, based on the BRBE model, we plan to do the following: (i) study a coarse toll regime, (ii) introduce the redistribution of toll revenue, (iii) design a tradable travel credit scheme, and (iv) consider three travel modes, i.e., autoonly mode, transit-only mode, and park-and-ride mode.
